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Abstract 
This article examines some of the deeper meanings of the denial of accountability in killings 
perpetrated by British soldiers during the conflict in Northern Ireland, as part of the debate 
on how to deal with the legacy of the past. It investigates the ways in which such ‘soldier-
perpetrators’ are turned, instead, into ‘soldier-victims’ and asks what this tells us about the 
political culture that shapes such a response. In part, it will be argued, this is the product of 
a longer term Manichean distinction, deeply embedded in the history of empire and its 
wars, between ‘civilians’ and barbarians’. Here lawfulness, as a mark of ‘civility’, is identified 
with the self-image of the (post-) imperial state, contrasted with the unlawful chaos of the 
barbarian ‘Other’. In the context of both the counterinsurgency wars of the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century, and amid a presiding mood of ‘post-imperial melancholia’ 
and ‘heroic failure’, the figure of the ‘soldier-victim’ therefore becomes a means to turn the 
wrongs of state violence into an ideological potent imaginary of empire, the state (and its 
agents) as themselves those who have been wronged. 
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Introduction: From Afghanistan to Northern Ireland and Back 
In April 2017 convicted murderer British Army Sergeant Alexander Blackman was freed from 
jail, having served only three years of a life sentence. In late 2011, in contravention of both 
international and British law, Blackman (or ‘Marine A’ as he was known throughout his trial) 
shot dead a wounded, captured Taliban fighter in southern Afghanistan (Build-up to 
Moment Marine Shoots Dead [a] Wounded Taliban Fighter, 2017). Head-cam footage 
recording the killing inadvertently came to light in 2013, leading to his trial and conviction. A 
vociferous public campaign soon followed calling for Blackman’s release, spearheaded by 
the right wing British newspaper the Daily Mail and a raft of leading political, military and 
other public figures. They succeeded, after his original conviction was reduced to 
manslaughter.  
 
Blackman had been described as the first British soldier found guilty of murder ‘on the 
battlefield’ or on ‘active service since the Second World War’ (Marine ‘A’: The Inside Story, 
2017; Marine ‘A’: Criminal or Casualty of War, 2015). This was at best carefully, if not 
deceptively, worded. There had in fact been a number of British soldiers convicted 
previously for murders they committed while on duty in the North of Ireland, responsible 
for a handful of the over 300 people (most civilians from the nationalist/Catholic 
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community) directly killed by the British Army during the three decades of conflict 
(McGovern 2010, p.145). Those soldiers found guilty included several members of the 
locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a unit long also the subject of allegations 
of widespread collusion with loyalist paramilitary groups (Cadwallader, 2013; McGovern, 
2019; Pat Finucane Centre, 2014; Ryder, 1991, p.150). In a few (very rare) cases, there were 
also murder convictions for members of the regular British Army. These included one of four 
members of the Argyll and Sutherland regiment found guilty (long after the event and only 
because of a complex chain of circumstances) of playing a role in the brutal ‘pitchfork 
killings’ of two Catholic farmers – one a leading local civil rights activist - in Co. Fermanagh in 
1972 (Burke, 2018; MacDonald, 2012; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, 1999, 
pp.286-7; Newsinger, 2002, pp.128-9). The ‘Argylls’ had already achieved some notoriety for 
their imposition of a self-declared ‘tribal law’ during the final stages of Britain’s 
counterinsurgency campaign in the Crater district of Aden in 1967 (Empire Warriors: Mad 
Mitch and His Tribal Law, 2004; French, 2011; ). Crafted by the Argyll’s commanding officer 
in Aden, Colonel ‘Mad Mitch’ Mitchell, ‘tribal law’ involved a vicious regime of beatings, 
torture, theft and murder (including the stabbing of Arab youths) intended to suppress the 
anti-colonial opposition and terrorise the local population. Mitchell would later go on to 
become a Conservative MP, then military adviser to, first, the racist regime in Rhodesia and 
- by the 1980s – the anti-Soviet mujahedeen in Afghanistan (Obituary: Lt-Col. ‘Mad Mitch’ 
Mitchell, 1996). 
 
Other than that, there were only four instances where soldiers of the regular British Army 
were convicted for Northern Ireland conflict killings. In each of these cases, a vigorous 
campaign led by the Daily Mail, right wing political leaders and high-ranking former British 
Army officers had called, successfully, for their early release. In each case, too, the convicted 
soldiers not only served less than three years in jail but returned to the ranks of the British 
Army after being freed. At least one, Private Lee Clegg, who shot dead two unarmed and 
innocent teenagers in a car in West Belfast in 1990 - and was later decorated for his service 
to the Parachute Regiment - was part of the British occupying forces in Afghanistan (Hickley 
and Williams 2007, Rayment 2005). 
 
These cases, stretching back over several decades and up to the present, illustrate the 
vigour with which certain powerful elements of British society are willing to defend British 
soldiers even in the extremely rare circumstances where a British court has found them 
guilty of murder while involved in contemporary counterinsurgency wars. In the process, it 
will be argued, these state killers become, in the popular imagination, (what will be termed) 
‘soldier-victims’. Rather than perpetrators of extrajudicial military violence they are cast, 
instead, as themselves the victims of forces of lawlessness and, if not quite paragons of 
virtue, then at least the battered outposts of ‘civility’ in a sea of ‘barbarism’. What, then, we 
might ask, does this tell us about the meaning of the figure of the ‘soldier-victim’ in British 
society? What, more broadly, does the figure of the ‘soldier-victim’ encapsulate and signify? 
And what impact does this have in seeking justice for crimes committed during the 
counterinsurgency wars of late empire? 
 
The aim of this article is to address these questions through the prism of the on-going and 
fractious debate on how to deal with the legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which brought to an end three decades of 
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conflict, there has been much progress on many issues as well as many false dawns and 
backward steps. However, what the North has not seen - twenty years on - is the sort of 
comprehensive truth and justice mechanism introduced in many post-conflict societies 
across the world as a means to address a past record of mass human rights abuses (Hayner, 
2010; Lawther, Moffett, Jacobs, 2017). This article is also therefore designed to offer some 
reflections on why this is so, notably in relation to continuing non-accountability for state 
killings during the conflict. The rhetorical figure of the ‘soldier-victim’, it is argued, is one 
that often precludes and prevents such prosecutions. In that sense, Blackman, Clegg and the 
handful of other British soldiers convicted for state killings, are the exceptions that prove an 
otherwise more hidden rule. 
 
To examine these issues the article will be divided into six parts. First, it sets out briefly the 
debate on dealing with the past in the North. Second, it examines evidence of the 
substantial, sustained and continuing efforts of the British Establishment to ensure that no 
former British soldier faces prosecution or any legal consequences for wrongdoing 
committed during the conflict before (third) noting some continuities evident here with a 
‘culture of impunity’ that existed during the conflict itself. The article then examines how 
such impunity cultures are shaped by a much more deep-seated, longer term (and culturally 
and politically powerful) identification of British military, and imperial, violence with a 
conception of ‘civility’ contrasted to alleged anti-colonial ‘barbarism’. This, in turn, it will be 
argued, reflects the role of a self-justifying idea of inherent lawfulness as part and parcel of 
modern right-wing formulations of British/English identity and a central trope of what has 
been termed ‘post-imperial melancholia’ (Gilroy, 2004). Following Gilroy, the work of 
leading British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton (2017, 2014, 2001) will be taken as a 
paradigm of this condition, illustrating - in exemplary fashion - a conception of English 
national identity centred on a fiction of an inbuilt affinity, if not innate instinct, for justice. 
Finally, the (sometimes ambiguous) representations of the ‘soldier-victim’ evident in 
contemporary counterinsurgency wars, it will be argued, both reflects and exemplifies this 
tendency toward post-imperial melancholia, a reconfigured ‘cult of heroic failure’, and the 
conceit of intrinsic English - or British – civility (O’Toole, 2018). Rooted firmly in the violence 
of an imperial past as well as a – deeply troubled and troubling - ‘postcolonial’ present, the 
agonistic pairing of martial power and sense of grievance contained in the twinning of the 
‘soldier-victim’, reflects, too, tensions inherent in the on-going denial of empire, even as its 
counterinsurgency wars are being fought today. 
 
(Not) Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland 
The question as to whether or not killings by former British soldiers in Northern Ireland 
should be subject to re-investigation, prosecution and potential conviction forms part of a 
wider (and deeply contentious) debate about how to deal with the post-Troubles legacy. 
Between 1968 and 1998, over 3,600 people were killed (and 30,000 injured) as a result of 
the conflict in and about Northern Ireland (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, 1999). 
60% of victims were killed by Irish republican paramilitary groups, primarily the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). Pro-state loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for just over 30% 
of deaths. Roughly 10% were attributed to state forces - both the British Army and the local 
police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). There have, in addition, been 
longstanding allegations of state involvement and collusion in deaths attributed to 
paramilitaries – particularly (although not exclusively) killings by loyalists (McGovern, 2019, 
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2017, 2016; Punch, 2012; Rolston, 2005). At the conflict’s end, roughly 2,000 deaths 
remained unsolved and without anyone having been held responsible. Outstanding 
allegations of state impunity have remained. 
 
There are many criticisms that can be directed at (what have become known as) post-
conflict, human rights-based, transitional justice mechanisms as means to deal with such 
legacy issues. For example, if understood as part of an emancipatory political vision, they 
can be confounded by many of the pitfalls facing ‘left legalism’ identified by Wendy Brown 
(2000).  The deployment of rights-derived defences of state actors engaged in spying, covert 
actions or accused of extrajudicial killing, testifies to the ways in which neutral, universal 
rights can entrench the subordination of others ‘by augmenting the power of the already 
powerful’ (Brown, 2000, p.232).  Such truth and justice strategies can, however, provide 
some means to challenge state narratives of the past and the crimes of the powerful. They 
represent a potential space within which the unequal struggle of differentially empowered 
social groups can yet allow those, challenging the interests of the state, to ‘narrow the range 
of permissible lies’ (Michael Ignatieff, cited in Hayner, 2010, p.25).  
 
In any case, the North has not had any comprehensive process to deal with the issues left in 
the conflict’s wake. Rather, a ‘piecemeal approach’ has seen a series of disparate initiatives 
launched over two decades, including public inquiries, investigations carried out by special 
‘legacy’ police units and a newly created Police Ombudsman’s office, and various court 
cases (Bell, 2002; Lundy, 2008; Lundy, 2012; Lundy and McGovern, 2008; McGovern, 2013). 
Meeting with varying degrees of success, many of these efforts have been deeply flawed 
and done little to settle matters. This fragmented landscape has not happened by chance. 
Crucial have been state attempts to manage truth recovery - particularly in cases of state 
killings and collusion allegations. Setbacks and ongoing evidence of a culture of state secrecy 
have been part of a worrying ‘roll-back’ of human rights provisions established as a 
cornerstone of the post-Good Friday Agreement settlement (Committee on the 
Administration of Justice, 2011, 2013, 2015). Innovative, inclusive and encompassing 
recommendations on a way forward, set out by an officially established Consultative Group 
on the Past in 2009, were cast aside by the Government almost before they were made 
public (Consultative Group on the Past, 2009).  These would, however, form the basis of a 
settlement on legacy issues agreed by the British and Irish Governments and main parties of 
the North as part of a further agreement reached in 2014 (Northern Ireland Office, 2014). 
Draft legislation was, however, followed by the launch of another public consultation 
process (Northern Ireland Office, 2018). The purpose of which seems only to seek to delay, 
defer - if not completely derail and deny - the creation of the legacy process.  
 
Prosecutions, Amnesties and a ‘Disproportionate Focus’ 
There has been a parallel, rising chorus of rancorous opposition directed against ‘legacy’ 
measures, in general, and (in particular) holding British soldiers accountable for past wrongs 
(Collins, 2018; Matchett, 2018). This has been so, for example, with public debate of 
potential prosecutions against the members of the Parachute Regiment – an elite unit of the 
British Army - responsible for killing 14 people during a Civil Rights march in Derry in January 
1972 (McCann, Sheils and Hannigan, 1992; Mullan, 1997; Walsh, 2000). In 2010 a second 
public inquiry into these events, chaired by Lord Saville, overturned the ‘whitewash’ findings 
of a first (Saville, 2010; Walsh, 2000: pp.54-112; Widgery, 1972). Reversing the earlier 
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exoneration of the soldiers, Saville (2010) found the victims to have been unarmed and 
innocent and declared the killings ‘unjustified and unjustifiable’ (McDonald, Bowcott and 
Mulholland, 2010). A much delayed, halting and long-drawn-out police investigation 
followed. In early 2019 the decision was taken that of the 16 accused British soldiers only 
one – ‘Soldier F’ - would be prosecuted, and for only two of the five killings for which he 
may have been responsible. The victim’s families, vindicated by the decision to prosecute 
after a decades long campaign, were at the same time left deeply disappointed and 
dismayed  that charges would not be brought against the other accused (never mind laying 
responsibility at the door of those who had ordered the troops in and commanded them 
that day) (McCann, 2019). However, true to form, the mere prospect of finding those who 
carried out the Bloody Sunday killings accountable in the courts had already led to a 
concerted campaign (by the inevitable right wing elements of the British press and former 
senior military and political figures) denouncing the investigation as a ‘witch hunt’ (Mendick, 
2018). 
 
The cry of ‘witch-hunt’ has become ever shriller and broadened out with allegations that 
state killing cases are being singled out for investigation by a ‘Legacy Unit’ currently working 
within the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) (Moloney, 2018; Newton Dunn and 
Wilkinson, 2017; Hawkes and Johnson, 2017).i The call has been taken up by the populist 
press, boosting campaigns and rallies organised by newly created ‘veterans’ organisations 
(Devlin, 2018; Ingham, 2018). It is a mix of anti-establishment and nationalistic rhetoric that 
has also attracted Far Right support, for whom - against the backdrop of the failed 
campaigns of the ‘War on Terror’ in Iraq and Afghanistan - veterans issues have been 
merged with proto-militarism and anti-Muslim racism to further foster a Brexit-inspired rise 
(Stewart, 2017; Veterans Against Terrorism, 2018). 
 
But opposition to prosecuting British soldiers for past wrongs is not limited to the outer 
right fringes of British politics. Leading figures and former ministers within the Conservative 
party have been much to the fore (Fallon, 2018; Willetts, 2018). Their defence of former 
soldiers has in turn been echoed and endorsed by the British Government. In late 2018, for 
example, British Prime Minister, Theresa May (HC Deb 12 September 2018) condemned 
what she described as a ‘disproportionate focus’ in legacy investigations in Northern Ireland 
on conflict-killings perpetrated by British soldiers. She had already declared as ‘patently 
unfair [that] terrorists are not being investigated’ and that ‘the only people being 
investigated’ were former British soldiers or policemen (HC Deb 9 May 2018). These 
sentiments were echoed by the current Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Karen 
Bradley, who condemned a ‘disproportionate emphasis on the actions of the military and 
law-enforcement agencies’ (HC Deb 9 May 2018).  
 
The only problem with the ‘disproportionate focus’ argument is it happens to be untrue. 
Official PSNI statistics refute such allegations. As of late 2017, it is true that 30% of current 
legacy investigations concerned the 10% of conflict deaths that involved state killings (HC 
Defence Committee, 2017, p.7). This is the foundation of the ‘disproportionate’ position. 
However, this leaves aside the number of completed legacy investigations in which state 
killing cases are significantly under-represented. As of 2017, investigation has been 
completed of only three state killings - a mere 2% of the total. 64% were of deaths 
attributed to republicans (HC Defence Committee, 2017, p.7). Far from a focus and priority 
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given to deaths attributed to the security forces, this suggests the opposite has been true. If 
so many (though still a minority) of current investigations are into killings by British soldiers 
and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) that is largely because they are the 
only ones left. Likewise, five times more legacy prosecutions had been pursued against 
alleged paramilitary members than against British soldiers (Kearney, 2017; Young, 2017). 
‘These figures speak for themselves’, declared the Chief Constable of the PSNI (cited in 
Kearney, 2018). The officially appointed Northern Victims’ Commissioner (cited in Walker, 
2018) similarly stated that the Prime Minister’s comments were ‘completely in 
contravention of the facts’ and there is ‘no evidence that there has been any systematic or 
unsystematic targeting of state forces’. 
 
However, British policymakers have not allowed such facts to impact on their views or 
hinder their work. The false depiction of a ‘disproportionate focus’ on investigating state 
killings has also had worrying policy implications. In 2017 a House of Commons report (2017, 
p.16) proposed the introduction of a statute of limitations – essentially an amnesty -  to 
cover ‘all Troubles-related incidents’ in which ‘former members of the Armed Forces’ were 
involved.ii The current Defence Minister is an avowed advocate of such a move and has 
been working on legislating to that end (Buckley, 2018a, 2018b). As far as the British 
Government is concerned the only problem at present - and one which equally exercises the 
ire of the right-wing press - is how to put such an amnesty in place without having to do the 
same for former members of the IRA (Little, 2018). A ‘statute of limitations’ for British 
soldiers accused of extrajudicial killings or war crimes - in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as 
Northern Ireland – now seems to be very much on its way. Cutting across due process, there 
have also been suggestions that no prosecutions of former British soldiers would proceed 
unless expressly approved by the Attorney General - something the record of the past 
suggests they would very likely be unwilling to do. Indeed, in the wake of the decision to 
prosecute ‘Soldier F’ in the case of Bloody Sunday, officials expressed regret that such a 
statute had not already been put in place. This followed profoundly troubling (if not illegal) 
comments from several senior Conservative figures in the lead up to the ‘Soldier F’ 
announcement that no such prosecutions should happen. The Northern Ireland Secretary 
Karen Bradley (HC Deb 6 March 2019), outrageously, went so far as to tell the House of 
Commons that all the killings perpetrated by ‘the military and police’ during the conflict 
were ‘not crimes’ but were people ‘fulfilling their duties in a dignified and appropriate way’. 
 
Cultures of Impunity 
Contrary to current claims of a witch-hunt aimed at British soldiers for past crimes - the 
killers of Bloody Sunday chief among them - the record also shows there was, if anything, a 
long term de facto immunity and a priori amnesty for military wrongdoing during the 
conflict itself (Lundy, 2012). Throughout the ‘Troubles’, public adherence to the principle 
that security force personnel were subject to the rule of law was paralleled by an unspoken 
culture of (at the very least) official tolerance. For political reasons, from the outset of the 
conflict, the formal indemnification of British soldiers for serious wrongdoing on duty - or 
attempts to ‘legalise lawlessness’ - was viewed as a problem (Attorney General Basil Kelly, in 
Committee on Interrogation Procedures, 1972). Such a move would have made apparent 
the suspension of liberal democratic norms that were, in practice, part and parcel of the 
counterinsurgency campaign. Likewise it would have immediately drawn unwelcome 
analogies to other late colonial wars. So, informally (but no less powerfully for that), 
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assurances were given by, for example, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland in 1971, 
that he would do ‘all within his power to protect the security forces from criminal 
proceedings’ (‘Memo from Head of C2 at HQNI and the Attorney General, 6 December 1971, 
AG 1971, pp.2-3’).    
 
A range of ways and means were therefore put in place, adapting and subverting legal due 
process, to all but ensure military immunity from prosecution whilst maintaining the façade 
of ‘constitutional propriety’ (Ignatieff, 2004, p.72; McGovern, 2010, p.139). These included, 
for example, (in the early days of the conflict) making sure that the investigation of state 
killings was conducted by military rather than civil authorities; fundamentally changing the 
nature of the court system and drastically expanding the ‘reasonable force’ grounds on 
which state lethal force was justified (Jennings, 1990; Lundy, 2012; Ní Aoláin, 2000; Urban, 
1992, 1997; Walsh, 2000). A phalanx of Army legal experts was readily available to provide 
advice so that soldiers’ narratives of events could explain away their actions as ‘self-
defence’. As a civil court found in 2011, denouncing one such British soldier’s testimony, 
some victims seemed to develop a surprising (indeed, life-imperilling) tendency - contrary to 
‘reason and the instinct for self-preservation’ - to reach for weapons they did not actually 
have (High Court of Justice of NI, 2011, p.5). During the conflict, however, such narratives 
were almost always accepted by the courts. Legal and legislative changes could combine, 
too, with an informal culture of institutionalized permissiveness that had all the more 
purchase within the ‘closed system’ of the ‘total institution’ of the military (Goffman, 1961).  
 
Much here points to a culture of impunity that goes far beyond the idea that state killings 
were merely the result of ‘indiscipline’ or the actions of individual soldiers that then needed 
to be covered up in the aftermath. The calculated and co-ordinated steps to ensure British 
soldiers would not end up in court cannot be viewed in isolation from wider patterns of 
state practice that suggest otherwise. These included routine calls from senior military 
figures (often on the eve of major operations), for their soldiers to be ‘uncompromising and 
determined’ in their dealing with local people (Briefing notes for officers and soldiers: Operation 
Motorman, 1972). One mused (just prior to the Bloody Sunday shootings) whether the 
‘minimum force necessary’ to restore order might be to ‘shoot selected ringleaders’ of 
rioters (Major General Robert Ford, cited in McCann, 2019). Indeed, the draconian steps 
taken sometimes paled by comparison with the ‘doomsday scenarios’ given serious 
consideration by the British political and military hierarchy. One plan explored in depth in 
mid-1971 would have seen the introduction of martial law, the full-scale deployment ‘on a 
war-like footing [of] overwhelming military force’ to achieve the ‘saturation’ and ‘swamping’ 
of Catholic working class area and the creation of ‘free-fire zones’ (within which it would be 
‘essential for a soldier to be able to open fire without fear of legal penalty in certain 
circumstances’) (cited in Charters, 2017, p.164; Sanders, 2013, p.477). It was an option kept 
on the table for some time afterwards. In light of that, the numerous state killings and 
widespread violence that followed the introduction of internment could be viewed by 
military planners as a more benign outcome than might otherwise have been the case - less 
a product of condemnable excess than condonable restraint.  
 
Nor can efforts to exonerate individual soldiers be divorced from the whitewash work done 
by various inquiries and tribunals, or from the darker dimensions of the North’s covert ‘dirty 
war’ - from the use of ‘counter-gangs’ like the Military Reaction Force in the early 1970s, the 
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deployment of covert counterinsurgency units (such as the SAS) in ‘set-piece’ shoot-to-kill 
ambushes in the 1980s, and widespread collusion, institutional in scale, scope and nature, 
evident through to the 1990s (Britain’s Secret Terror Force, 2013; Hearty, 2014; McGovern, 
2019; Murray, 1990). 
 
While there were some differences, these patterns of state practice also find echoes in 
other, earlier, post-1945 British military colonial campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, 
Cyprus and Aden (Drohan, 2017; Newsinger, 2002). Creating spaces of legal indeterminacy, 
categories of communities subject to different regimes of punishment, and the partial 
implementation of law, were all legalistic strategies deployed to mask the violence of 
empire in an emerging era of international human rights (Khalili, 2013, p.81). Fighting 
‘liberal wars’ in colonial and ‘neo-imperial’ settings sees a counterinsurgency violence 
forged by a doctrine of necessity fused with, and hidden by, a claim to liberal legal principles 
and the language of a ‘civilising mission’ (Khalili, 2013, p.4). Within British 
counterinsurgency theory, the outcome were the myths of adherence to a supposedly 
benign ‘hearts and minds’ approach and ‘minimum force’ doctrine, that combined with the 
(often wholesale, sometimes maximalist) violence of its interest - rather than moral - driven 
practice (McGovern, 2015, 2019, Owens, 2015). 
 
Of course, such cultures of impunity have an institutional, practical and instrumental logic. 
(Mostly) young men sent by the state to kill and maim may be less inclined to do so if 
potentially liable to criminal culpability at some unknown later date. That is something of 
which military hierarchies are all too aware. It forms a less openly spoken corollary to the 
‘informal understanding of mutual obligations’ commonly known today as the ‘military 
covenant’. But there is much more here besides. In order to see more clearly the ways in 
which the figure of the ‘soldier-victim’ may encapsulate some of the contradictions of the 
violence and rhetoric of the ‘liberal wars’ of empire, it may be worth taking a few further 
steps back.  
 
Civilians and Barbarians, Colonialism and Law  
UDR members and the ‘pitchfork’ killer aside, the dishonour of being the first British soldier 
convicted of murder during modern conflict belongs to Private Ian Thwain. He shot Thomas 
‘Kidso’ Reilly in the back on a hot August evening in west Belfast in 1983 (McKittrick, Kelters, 
Feeney and Thornton, 1999, pp.948-949). Thwain told the court he feared Reilly - who had 
just been stopped and searched by a British Army patrol - might have had a gun hidden 
under his shirt when he was not actually wearing one. So incredulous was his evidence that, 
highly unusually, the judge simply did not believe him and said the defence case had been 
‘manufactured’ (Mr Justice Higgins, cited in Jennings, 1990, p.122). Convicted to life 
imprisonment, Thwain was nevertheless released into ‘military custody’ only two years 
later, following a press campaign to free him. He immediately returned to active service 
with his regiment. 
 
In the same year Ian Thwain murdered ‘Kidso’ Reilly, Seamus Deane (1985) argued the 
conflict in the North, indeed much of the history of relations between the two islands, 
exemplified  in the 1981 republican hunger strike, was all too often ideologically framed as a 
binary struggle between ‘civilians’ and ‘barbarians’.iii It was a distinction, said Deane, with a 
long history. The essential paradox of ‘European theories of freedom’ from John Locke 
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onward, Deane (1985, p.33) argued, lay in the contradiction that ‘law compels men to be 
free’ forming the basis of a difference drawn between the civilised and the barbaric, where 
‘those who live under the law are civilians; those who lie beyond it are barbarians’. It was a 
logic, said Deane, already evident before being articulated in philosophical terms by Locke, 
that had done much to shape English expansionist and early colonial policy in Ireland from 
the late sixteenth century onward.  
 
Likewise, for Ellen Wood (2003, pp.81-2, pp.96-100), the epoch-shaping justifications for the 
early seventeenth century Plantation of Ulster prefigured Locke’s later extension of the 
concept of terra nullis and ushered in the era of capitalist empire and the violent 
expropriation of property on the permissive foundation of a ‘specifically English sense [of] 
value’. The distinction of barbarians, devoid of law, and settler rights dressed up in claims of 
‘natural law’, allowed such colonial appropriation without ‘the consent of any local 
sovereign’ precisely because indigenous custom and practice was relegated to a Hobbesian 
chaos of Law’s absence (Wood, 2003, p.97).  In this sense, Ireland became a ‘legal seedbed 
for the expansion of the British empire’ (McAuslan, 2015, p.201).  
 
Certainly the writings of early propagandists (and practitioners) of English colonialism in 
Ireland – such as the poet Edmund Spenser and Sir John Davies – provided exemplary 
models for later justifications of colonial expansion, appropriation and dispossession, not 
least in the Americas (Pawlisch, 2010; Orr, 2003.  For Spenser, a policy of war, of ‘extra-legal 
slaughter’ and ‘military and judicial violence’, was required as the only ‘agent of civilization’ 
by which the ‘barbarous’ the Irish might be ‘compelled to be free’ (Orr, 2003, p.401. See 
also Canny, 1973, p.581).. On the other hand, Davies - Attorney General in Ireland at the 
time of the Ulster Plantation - viewed English Common Law as a key ‘instrument of 
colonisation’ and a means to fundamentally recast social property relations. His was a logic 
of ‘legal imperialism’ and programme of ‘practical colonialism’ that was an important 
template for the future (Pawlisch, 2010). 
 
Whatever separated the views of Spenser and Davies, however, more united them. Both 
saw colonial ‘pacification’ as the primary goal. Both also understood that the power of Law 
relied on the capacity for force that lay behind it. Both also, crucially, saw English Common 
Law as what distinguished the boundary between the civility of the coloniser and barbarity 
of the colonised. For both, it was the possession of English Common Law, above all else, that 
defined civility, made the English who they were, and allowed for colonial ‘rights’ to always 
take precedence over the ‘lewd customs’ of the native.  
 
This, too, has proven to be a foundational aspect of ‘legal imperialism’.  Here also, in 
property-based, embryonic form, was a ‘standard of civilization’ that would develop over 
time as an international legal mechanism by which ‘people or nations have historically 
been… barred from the international society of states’ (Bowden 2009, p.103). Forming part 
of a ‘universalising Western imperial project’, the ‘principle of a legal standard of civilization’ 
not only facilitated imperial expansion by helping to ‘subordinate and extinguish alien 
cultures’ and enshrine European norms, values and interests in the body of international 
law, it also helped make the very idea of Law and lawfulness synonymous with the sense of 
collective self of emerging popular identities of colonialism and empire (Bowden 2009, 




For Seamus Deane (1985, p.39, p.42) a ‘putative division’ between barbarism and civilization 
would continue to act as a ‘blighted distinction’, governing our responses, shaping the 
language of politics and setting a limit to our imagination of and about the North of Ireland 
into our own time. On the one hand, Irish barbarism has been imagined as a ‘chaos of 
arbitrary wills’ and a social order dominated by ‘local kinship loyalties and sentiments’ 
(Deane, 1985, p.39). On the other, English civilization as a ‘system of law’ in which the 
tradition of Common Law has long been imagined as the historical foundation of a readily 
assumed affinity between Englishness, civility and justice. It is a distinction we may continue 
to see echoed more widely, and more destructively, in the language of ‘failed states’, ‘liberal 
peace’ and peoples ‘unfit for liberty’ elsewhere. 
 
Englishness, Post-Imperial Melancholia and ‘Law’s Enchantment’ 
Celebrations of ‘the law’ and lawfulness as a ‘peculiarity of the English’ are not something 
consigned to a long-gone past (Thompson 1965). They can, also take on a range of distinctly 
different, at times radical, forms. One need think only of George Orwell’s 1941 hymn to 
‘socialism and the English genius’ in which his efforts to rouse a spirit of left popular 
patriotism in support of the war are centred on extolling the virtues of English national 
character (Orwell, 1982). For Orwell, at the core of what he calls the ‘English mystique’ and 
an ‘all-important English trait’, is a respect for ‘legality’ and a ‘belief in “the law”’ as 
something that should be ‘incorruptible’ and ‘impartially administered’. Similarly the 
eminent historian E.P. Thompson (1975, p.265-6) argued that a centuries-old tradition of 
English law, enshrining and entwined with ‘customary practice’, able to defend citizens from 
‘power’s all-intrusive claims’, represents a ‘cultural achievement of universal significance 
[and] an unqualified human good’. Whether the fruits of such English liberty were ever 
extended to imperial subjects is, however, another question again - and one which 
undoubtedly also greatly troubled both Orwell and Thompson.  
 
However, it is the identification of ‘the law’ and lawfulness with Englishness (sometimes, 
Britishness) as a distinct strain within modern British conservative thought – and its even 
further right counterparts – that is the primary focus here. It is from such quarters and 
ideological standpoint that the vociferous defence of accused British soldiers become 
‘soldier-victims’ is most often heard. This is also an outlook in which a particular, if not 
unique, English gift for law-making and law-abiding forms part of a more pervasive, 
powerful and pernicious cast of mind, that has helped shape the rhetoric of a more recent, 
surging – if often inchoate – pro-Brexit, ‘take-back-control’ populist English nationalist 
project (O’Toole, 2016, 2018). In this perspective, it will be argued, ‘the law’ is 
transmogrified (somewhat ironically, given a supposed English predilection for all things 
empirical) into a sort of transcendent, mystified force, that is, in turn, regarded as the 
product - and property - of a particular culture and tradition, as well as an all-too-often 
racialized idea of civilization. This, too, has both a much longer lineage and contemporary 
face. 
 
Such contemporary Right narratives of English nationalism can be understood as a product 
of what Paul Gilroy (2004) calls ‘post-imperial melancholia’. Standing in binary opposition to 
the promise of a ‘convivial culture’ - built on the boisterous, productive everyday 
interactions of a multiculturalism moving ‘beyond race’ - ‘post-imperial melancholia’ has 
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framed ‘race talk’ in Britain for decades (Gilroy, 2004, p.95). For Gilroy, this ‘syndrome’, 
‘pathological’ in nature, combines a culturally immersive yearning for a falsely drawn vision 
of the imperial past with an equally imaginary sense of ‘imperilled Englishness’ (Gilroy, 
2004, p.98, p.130). In turn, this provides a means to both offset the troubling recognition of 
empire’s crimes and replace it with the ‘exceptionally powerful feelings of comfort and 
compensation produced by the prospect of even the partial restoration of the country’s 
long-vanished homogeneity’ (Gilroy, 2004, p.95). The suppression of knowledge of imperial 
violence required comes at ‘considerable moral and psychological cost’ and the ‘guilt-ridden 
loathing and depression’ that follows is expressed instead through ‘Britain’s xenophobic 
responses to the strangers who have intruded upon it more recently’ (Gilroy, 2004, p.98, 
p.102).  Ultimately, then, the loss of empire and the uncertainty left in its wake, produces 
this sinuous, evocative, distorting and destructive state of ‘melancholia’; understood as the 
‘depressed reaction following a radical loss of moral legitimacy’ (Gilroy, 2004, p.107). 
 
As a powerful social, political and cultural force in contemporary British social life, post-
imperial melancholia can only function, then, through a collective amnesia of empire’s 
violence. This is paralleled by a self-drawn portrait of Britishness and Englishness as 
synonymous with the law and lawfulness. In his dissection of ‘post-imperial melancholia’ 
Gilroy (2004, p.125) identifies England: An Elegy, written by the leading British philosopher 
and Conservative guru Roger Scruton, as a more than usually coherent and serious 
expression of the condition. As the title suggests, England: An Elegy (2001, pp.44-46) is a 
nostalgia-drenched study of what Scruton sees as the ‘real causes’ of ‘Englishness’; 
something he understands as a ‘distinct human type’, that is fast disappearing, if not already 
lost. Shaped by landscape and church this ‘English character’, Scruton (2001, p.56) argues, 
was also definitively and ‘profoundly influenced by the Common Law’. Rooted in ‘the 
ancient prerogatives of the people’, for Scruton (2001, pp.53-56), English Common Law 
stands not only as an ‘objective reality’, but as a sacred, spiritual force, ‘a version of the Holy 
Ghost – always present, always vigilant, always personal, always benign’. The result, he 
claims (Scruton 2001, p.53) is that the English ‘perhaps more than any people in the modern 
world… [are] sensitive to the distinction between power and authority’. This finds 
expression in an intrinsic English ‘instinct for justice and fair play’; a claim, Scruton insists 
(2001, p.55), that has only latterly become controversial and hard to establish, if not 
‘effectively destroyed’, by what he denounces as a ‘one-sided anti-colonial literature which 
has effectively demonised empire’. 
 
A sense of justice thus naturalised as an innate quality, generates in turn an inherent 
capacity for legal wisdom, celebrating ‘the ordinary individual in his attempt to live by the 
law’ (Scruton 2001, p.117). Tellingly Scruton saw such ‘legal wisdom’ personified in the 
figure of Lord Denning - described by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as 
‘probably the greatest English judge of modern times’ (cited in Burrell, 1999). As well as 
once writing of Black jury members as ‘an alien presence in our midst’, when faced with 
overwhelming evidence of British policemen being guilty of perjury, violence and forcing 
confessions in the appeal of the ‘Birmingham Six’, Denning (cited in Clifford, 2016) could see 
only ‘an appalling vista’ that ‘every sensible person in the land’ could simply not find true 
(Sedley, 1999. The Six went on to serve another decade in prison, before finally having their 
sentences quashed on those vey grounds. No convictions of the policemen involved 




Scruton further mystifies the identification of Englishness and the Law through an ‘ethical 
idea’ he names ‘enchantment’. Characterised as capturing ‘England in a nutshell… as a 
‘blessed, enchanted place’, ‘enchantment’, Scruton (2001, pp.210-2) argues, connects the 
land and legitimate order, where ‘justice, law and the mystical authority of kingship reign 
undisturbed’. Tellingly again, if ‘exemplified in the work of Shakespeare - the ‘most English’ 
as well as the ‘greatest of English writers’, the cultural expression of ‘enchantment’ can be 
found in a longer tradition established by earlier poets, the colonial adventurer and 
apologist Edmond Spenser chief among them. Further wrapped up in this mystified, self-
imagined Englishness is Common Law itself, cast as an ‘enchantment that lay over the land’ 
(Scruton 2001, p.129); a magical condition, paradoxically again, founded in an empirical 
creativity where law divines an already existing natural justice.  
 
So too, as enchanting law became part and parcel of imperial order, the ‘inherent fairness of 
its judgements’, Scruton contends, ‘made law England’s largest invisible export’ (Scruton 
2001, p.129). Much, of course, contests this beatified portrait of English law’s benign 
transplantation. In but one example - as Shashi Tharoor (2017, pp.90-91) has recently 
argued - while India's penal code is regularly given "pride of place" in celebrations of 
empire's legacy, justice under British rule was in fact "highly attentive to the skin colour of 
the defendant" and there was a pronounced "disinclination" on the part of British judges "to 
find any Englishman guilty of murdering an Indian". Attempts by rare, non-racist 
administrators to act otherwise invariably resulted in populist expatriate outcry, their swift 
removal and an equally rapid return to a far from egalitarian or colour-blind status quo.   
 
Yet, it is this myth of an innate, naturalised proclivity for justice, of an inherent decency in 
the face of the indecent, that is so central to the problems we face and reflective of what is 
at stake, in the figure of the accused British soldier. When pulp thriller author and right wing 
campaigner Frederick Forsyth (2017) cast the case of Marine ‘A’ as a ‘shambles that shames 
us all’, and the campaign to free him as one that started ‘with a gut feeling… just a very 
British sense that something had happened that was not fair’, in rampant, populist form he 
taps into a rich well of this sublimated sense of a collective self. It is equally reflected in 
populist responses to the potential prosecution of British soldiers for killings in the North. It 
is this much broader cultural assault, a charge of ‘barbarism’, of not submitting to the 
freedom of the law, which is therefore contested and then refused, by transforming the 
accused British soldier into the cipher of the ‘soldier-victim’.   
 
‘Wholesome Militarism’ and ‘Heroic Failure’: Empire, Pollution and the Figure 
of the Soldier-Victim 
Scruton’s conception of English ‘enchantment’, notes Paul Gilroy (2004, pp.125-126), stands 
in for much else. Anti-immigrant sentiment becomes aestheticized as ‘fatal 
disenchantment’; the result, then, not of racism but the ‘loss of enchantment which made 
home a place of safety and consolation’ (Scruton 2001, p.7-8).  As Gilroy (2004, pp.95-96, 
pp.107-108) also argues, the distinction of the ‘savage and the civilised’ is likewise a key 
element of the condition of post-imperial melancholia and (undermining the necessary 
narcissism of empire), ‘the loss of the fantasy of omnipotence’. The savage/civilized dualism, 
constantly revisited, provides an assurance that ‘we are still good while our uncivilized 
enemies are irredeemably evil’ (Gilroy 2004, pp.95-96). If on the one hand the figure of the 
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immigrant has come to stand for ‘all the ambiguities of the Empire’s painful and shameful… 
history’ it is opposed by no ‘single iconic human cipher’ but rather that, in darkest times, 
Britain would be ‘rescued by the sacrifice of its colonial soldiery’ (Gilroy 2004, pp.109-110). 
In Britain’s celebration of this ‘wholesome militarism’ the ‘warm glow’ of lost homogeneity 
is regained, if only temporarily, and in the imagination - ‘enchantment’, we might say, 
precariously re-cast (Gilroy 2004, pp.95-96).  
 
This points to the way in which the figure of the ‘imperial solider’, as a cultural construct, 
can and has been invested with a range of meanings capable of reflecting, reinforcing or 
unsettling pervasive, hegemonic political projects (Cooper and Hurcombe, 2009; Dawson, 
1994; Mosse, 1990; Wittman, 2011). More broadly, the figure of the soldier has often 
functioned as a wellspring, a ‘point of origin of a myth of community… instrumentalised as 
the bearer of the nation’s values and the embodiment of its perceived qualities’ (Cooper 
and Hurcombe 2009, p.103). Likewise, the long-standing iconography of the solider-hero has 
been a ‘potent configuration’ of populist imperial populism and hyper-masculine virtues 
(Dawson 1994, p.1). Casting the ‘imperial solider’ in heroic mode allowed for the celebration 
of martial prowess and a ‘warrior ethos’ as a key element of the self-identity of British and 
other European colonial powers.  It was a potent trope, if one long at odds with the savage 
realities of the ‘butcher and bolt’ campaigns of empire and the far greater burden of loss 
and sacrifice placed on the colonised by overwhelming western military technological 
superiority.  
 
The idealised self-image of the imperial soldier became harder to sustain in the public glare 
that increasingly accompanied the late colonial counterinsurgency conflicts of the post-1945 
period - whether in Palestine, Kenya, Aden or Vietnam; one reason why wilful amnesia 
surrounds so many of these wars. In turn, the more recent, often unpopular and ‘messy’ 
‘War on Terror’ counterinsurgency campaigns fought in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen 
greater complexities and ambiguities evident in the cultural meaning of the figure of the 
soldier (McCartney, 2011; McGarry and Ferguson, 2012; McGarry and Walklate, 2011). Loss, 
retreat and failure has been played out in the image of the ‘soldier-hero’ (still very far from 
absent) being joined by those of the soldier as ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’. In terms of the 
figure of the ‘victim’, for example, a complex of defeat and populist patriotism is evidenced 
in the image of the ‘home for heroes’ veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, betrayed by political 
masters and the ‘top brass’ as an ill-equipped, poor relative, reduced to the dread status of 
‘sepoy’ to his over-fed, uber-armed American cousin (Gilroy 2004, p.101).  
 
Yet in most such analyses of these representations, each of the figures – the soldier as 
‘hero’, ‘victim’ or ‘villain’ – still tend to be contrasted with each other. However, the figure 
of the ‘soldier-victim’ with which this study is concerned involves and invokes a darker and 
more interwoven matrix of cultural meanings. Here, victimhood is simultaneously and 
intimately tied up with, rather than distinct from, the figure of the ‘perpetrator’. Re-
imagined as wrongly accused, the ‘soldier-perpetrator’ is transformed, first, into victim - 
through imagined suffering – then hero, through imagined stoicism.  
 
In the process the efficacy of the soldier as central to the self-imagination of a virtuous 
national identity is revealed to be a sword that can cut both ways. In the figure of the 
accused soldier, it is the mythologised national self-imagination of lawful civility contrasted 
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with the violent barbarity of the colonial ‘other’ which is ultimately called into question. Yet, 
as Gilroy (2004, p.103) again suggests, an abiding feature of post-imperial nostalgia is a 
tendency to allocate a ‘large measure of [the] blame’ for empire’s crimes to empire’s victims 
while, conversely, Britain (and in this case it’s soldiers) are placed in the ‘honoured place of 
suffering’.  
 
This is a mood and mode of thought more widespread now than ever. For Fintan O’Toole 
(20018, p.xvii, p.66) a wave of anti-EU, Brexit-inspiring sentiment has seen a profound re-
imagination of the ‘structures of feeling’ underpinning English national identity and the 
‘strange legacy of colonialism’ evident in the mythic narratives of ‘the cult of heroic failure’. 
This celebration of empire’s disasters (from the Charge of the Light Brigade to Dunkirk via 
Scott of the Antarctic) was always an ‘exercise in transference’ (O’Toole, 20018, p.72). The 
imagined stoicism and personal virtue that ‘heroic failure’ enshrined were long a means to 
sublimate imperial violence and ‘fill the yawning gap’ between a ‘self-image of liberty and 
civility’ and the destructive realities of domination. What has changed, however, is that 
now, the myth of stoic endurance has been replaced by what O’Toole (20018) describes as a 
‘self-pitying’ turn.  
 
Here, the anxiety induced by the loss of power sees the rise of ‘zombie imperialism’ - where 
a sense of injustice is combined with that of superiority in a ‘perfect circle of self-pity and 
self-love’ (O’Toole, 2018, p.xvii, p.44, p.55). What is now envisaged is a ‘strange sense of 
imaginary oppression’ alongside a perverse ‘appropriation of anti-colonial resistance’. In this 
‘dystopian fantasy’, with the ‘coloniser [now] imagining itself as the colonized’, the ‘great 
holding back’ of stoic understatement is replaced instead by a hysterical ‘great letting go’ 
(O’Toole, 2018, p.34, p.77). A rhetoric of migrant ‘invasion’ and ‘colonization’ by stealth sees 
the empire make delusional claim to the real loss and dispossession of ‘subject peoples’ 
(O’Toole, 2018, p.91). ‘This may be the last stage of imperialism’, O’Toole (2018, p.21) 
concludes, ‘having appropriated everything else from the colonies, the dead empire 
appropriates the pain of those it has oppressed’. Here empire turns itself into piteous victim 
amid the ‘fag end’ imperial ‘Anglospheric adventures’ in Iraq and Afghanistan even as it 
simultaneously yearns, forlornly, for a post-EU rebirth of ‘Empire 2.0’ (O’Toole, 2018, p.84). 
This is an Atlanticist, Anglo-centric myth dream which, inevitably, for Roger Scruton (2017, 
p.113), is founded on the uniqueness of common law as the (definitively un-continental) 
‘roots of British freedom’. It is in this context of ‘post-imperial melancholia’ and ‘self-pity’, 
that the figure of the soldier-hero is then matched, if not eclipsed, by that of the soldier-
victim; a figure that comes to stand for the wider sense of victimhood, grafted with 
superiority, in this re-configured memory of empire and re-imagination of Englishness.  
 
The trick, as it were, remains ‘staying clean’; or rather of appearing to and, if having fallen, 
of being returned to a redeemed state of grace. For Scruton (2001, p.50) England’s genius 
for producing ‘intrepid adventurers and explorers’ (let’s say, rather, imperialists) was - 
paradoxically - a fear of contamination, rooted in the legacy of puritanism. However mythic, 
in the long history of empire, inoculated resistance to cultural interchange proved in 
practice, an imagined ability to remain ‘uncontaminated’, immunised by Englishness, of 
seeing people ‘among whom they wandered’ as ‘essentially other’ supposedly meant the 
administrators and soldiers of empire could ‘go anywhere, encounter anyone, suffer 
anything and emerge unpolluted’ (Scruton 2001, p.50. See also Colley, 2002, p.360). And so 
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we return again, now cast in terms of cleanliness and dirt, of pollution and inoculation, to 
the ‘blighting distinction’ of ‘civilians’ and ‘barbarians’. Just as, for Seamus Deane (1985, 
p.42), though drawing diametrically opposed conclusions, the horror of the 1981 republican 
hunger strike played out all too vividly an agreed contrast of mutual imagination; 
‘vulnerable, Irish squalor’ and the ‘filthy nakedness’ of the prisoner on the one hand, and 
the ‘impervious, impersonal English decontamination’ of the disinfecting jailers’ on the 
other. 
 
The ‘evacuation from consciousness of postcolonial conflicts’, says Gilroy (2004, p.97), 
parallels the affective power of the imagination of ‘wholesome militarism’. At the same time 
the figure of the ‘professional’ British soldier, untainted in intent and purpose, a cipher or 
moral cleanliness in a dirty world, must also be redeemed from the inevitable ‘pollution’ 
brought with the stark realities of war and suffering, and not least the ‘grey zone’ of 
counterinsurgency warfare. This sheen of cleanliness and order, helping to offset any 
troubling recognition of culpability and wrong-doing, is in part achieved by lionising the 
normative culture of the military ‘professional’.  Even more so, in the figure of the British 
soldier-victim is played out the comforting myth that ‘we’ remain clean even when our 
hands are made dirty by what we are ‘required’ to do. It means the oft-repeated apologia 
from official wrongdoing, of the ‘bad apple that spoils the barrel’, must be adapted further. 
In the case of the ‘solider-victim’, the ‘apple’ has not made itself rotten, still less, of course, 
does fault lie with the ‘barrel’ of the military institution. Rather, it is the malignant, infecting 
unclean context into which both have been placed that has soured the fruit. 
 
Conclusion: ‘Decades of Deceit’ and the Solider-Victim Figure 
In November 2018, some 47 years after the event, a fresh inquest finally opened in Belfast 
into what has become known as the Ballymurphy Massacre (Carroll, 2018). The inquest is 
charged with investigating the killing of 10 people in Ballymurphy, a Catholic working class 
area of West Belfast, over a period of 36 hours, from 9-11 August, 1971, at the hands of 
members of the Parachute Regiment (De Baróid, 1989, pp.112-24; McKittrick, Kelters, 
Feeney and Thornton, 1999, pp.82-90; The Ballymurphy Precedent, 2018).iv The victims 
included a 44-year-old father of thirteen children, a 45-year-old mother of eight and a 
Catholic priest shot in the back while waving a white handkerchief and giving the last rites to 
a badly wounded man.v Eyewitnesses say they saw a Paratrooper deliver a coup de grâce 
shot to the back of the head of one of the dead as he lay wounded on the ground.vi Another 
was shot 14 times. An eleventh victim, a local housing and youth community worker, who 
had come from England to work in the area, died from a heart attack after being subjected 
to a mock execution by a patrol of Paratroopers.vii There was no inquiry into the 
Ballymurphy massacre and no solider has ever been prosecuted or convicted for these 
killings. 
 
Less than six months after the massacre in Ballymurphy, soldiers of the self-same regiment 
would be responsible for the Bloody Sunday killings in Derry. If the story of Bloody Sunday 
would resonate around the world, the ‘Ballymurphy precedent’ became the ‘forgotten 
massacre’ (Bielenberg, 2018). Some of those directly involved in the Bloody Sunday killings 
had earlier taken part in the shootings in Ballymurphy. Despite the coruscating criticisms of 
the British Army made in 2010 Bloody Sunday Report, Lord Saville failed to lay blame at the 
feet of senior military and political leaders. In part, he said, this was because he was unable 
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to ‘express a view’ as to whether a ‘culture of impunity’ existed in the military given the lack 
of investigations and prosecutions in earlier state killings (Saville, 2010, p.92). In other 
words, only by looking at events like the Ballymurphy massacre, could the full picture have 
been revealed. That, Saville had decided, was beyond his remit. 
 
Yet, as with Bloody Sunday and other state killing cases in the North, efforts since to 
investigate British soldier’s actions in Ballymurphy have immediately been met with the 
inevitable cries of ‘witch hunt’ (Brown and Williams, 2015). Once again the ‘soldier-
perpetrators’ of Ballymurphy have begun to be turned into ‘soldier-victims’. In turn, 
memory of the Ballymurphy massacre has become the latest contested terrain on which the 
dualism of lawfulness and chaos, of civility and barbarity, is being played out. In this wider 
cultural and political sense what is at stake goes far beyond the fate of the ‘solider-
perpetrators’ turned ‘victims’ alone. Denying a history of wrongful violence, expunging such 
memories from the official record of the past, remains the work of a culture ensnared by 
post-imperial melancholia, and intent on preserving the ‘honoured place of suffering’ for 
itself.  The perverse reversal of roles of perpetrator and victim likewise echoes the shape-
shifting phantasm of ‘empire’ turned ‘colony’, of ‘invasion’ and ‘resistance’, in the anti-EU 
reactionary and violent dreaming of an ‘oppressed Englishness’ today. And as long as such 
distracting, disturbing delusions remain, and feed into wider post-imperial fantasies of the 
blighting distinction of the lawful civilian and lawless barbarian, the victims of illicit British 
Army violence, in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere, will remain officially un-
mourned, ‘un-grievable lives’ (Butler, 2010). 
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i
 The PSNI replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as the police force for Northern Ireland following 
sweeping reforms introduced as part of the post-Good Friday Agreement settlement. 
ii
 The House of Commons Committee also recommended such an amnesty should be extended to former 
members of the RUC. 
iii
 Civilians and Barbarians was originally published as a pamphlet in 1983. 
iv
 There have been recent, at present unsubstantiated, claims that two members of a loyalist paramilitary 
organisation, the Ulster Volunteer Force (a pro-state, Protestant paramilitary group) were also firing at 
Catholic civilians in Ballymurphy at the time of the massacre from a nearby Protestant estate. See, for 
example, Leitch, 2018. 
v
 The father of thirteen was Danny Teggart, the mother of seven was Joan Connolly and the Catholic priest 
(shot dead while going to the aid of Bobby Clarke, himself wounded from a shot in the back) was Fr Hugh 
Mullan. The other victims were Joseph Corr, Eddie Doherty, John Lavery, Paddy McCarthy, John McKerr, 
Joseph Murphy, Noel Phillips and Frank Quinn. See, ballymurphymassacre.com/cms/the-victims. 
vi
 The victim was 20-year-old Noel Phillips. See, ballymurphymassacre.com/cms/noel-phillips. 
vii
 The eleventh victim was Paddy McCarthy. He was stopped by an Army patrol on 11 August and had a gun 
thrust into his mouth. He suffered the heart attack shortly after. 
